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ABSTRACT
We have become a surveillance state. Cameras—both those
controlled by the state, and those installed by private entities—watch
our every move, at least in public. For the most part, courts have
deemed this public surveillance to be beyond the purview of the
Fourth Amendment, meaning that it goes largely unregulated—a
cause for alarm for many civil libertarians. This Article challenges
these views and suggests that we must listen to communities in
thinking about cameras and other surveillance technologies. For
many communities, public surveillance not only has the benefit of
deterring crime and aiding in the apprehension of criminals. It can
also function to monitor the police, reduce racial profiling, curb police
brutality, and ultimately increase perceptions of legitimacy. The
question thus becomes not how we can use the Fourth Amendment to
limit public surveillance, but rather: “How can we use the Fourth
Amendment to harness public surveillance’s full potential?”
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INTRODUCTION
Quite simply, we have become a surveillance state. Cameras—
both those controlled by the state, and those installed by private
entities—watch our every move, at least in public. For the most part,
this public surveillance is unregulated, beyond the scope of the
Fourth Amendment. To many civil libertarians, the extent of public
surveillance infringes upon our rights of privacy and anonymity, and
as such should be cause for alarm. On the other side of the debate,
law and order advocates argue that mass surveillance is a necessary
tool in deterring crime and apprehending criminals.
The goal of this Article is not to settle this debate, but rather to call
attention to the benefits of mass surveillance that are too often left
out of the discussion. This Article also urges that we listen to
communities. For many communities, public surveillance not only
deters crime and aids in the apprehension of criminals; it can also
function to monitor the police, reduce racial profiling, curb police
brutality, and ultimately increase perceptions of legitimacy. The
question thus becomes not how we can use the Fourth Amendment to
limit public surveillance, but rather, how can we use the Fourth
Amendment to harness public surveillance’s full potential?
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I gives a brief overview of the
extent to which we already live in a state of perpetual surveillance.
Part II then turns to the Fourth Amendment and to the general
consensus that surveillance cameras in public are not subject to
Fourth Amendment regulation. It then offers another reading of
Fourth Amendment cases, one that suggests that mass surveillance
should be subject to constitutional regulation.
Although my
argument is one for regulation, I am in fact in favor of more
surveillance, not less. I make the reasons for this stance clear in Part
III.
I. WATCHING YOU
To say that we are now being watched is to put it mildly. Consider
New York City, which recently partnered with Microsoft Corporation
to roll out a new public surveillance device called the Domain
Awareness System.1 Described as something “straight out of a sci-fi
1. See Rocco Parascandola & Tina Moore, NYPD Unveils New $40 Million
Super Computer System that Uses Data from Network of Cameras, License Plate
DAILY
NEWS,
Aug.
8,
2012,
Readers
and
Crime
Reports,
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-unveils-new-40-million-super-computersystem-data-network-cameras-license-plate-readers-crime-reports-article-1.1132135;
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novel,”2 the Domain Awareness System aggregates and analyzes
information from approximately 3,000 surveillance cameras around
the city and allows the police to scan license plates, cross-check
criminal databases, measure radiation levels, and more.3 Moreover,
this surveillance system operates continually—twenty-four hours a
day, seven days a week.4 As New York City Mayor Michael
Bloomberg said when he announced the new surveillance system—
which in fact had already been in use for perhaps a year5—“We’re not
your mom-and-pop’s Police Department anymore.”6
The Domain Awareness System is just the latest example of New
York’s use of surveillance technology. The use of video surveillance
as a crime prevention and detection tool dates back to at least 1973,
when cameras were installed in Times Square.7 By 1983, there were
approximately seventy-six cameras monitoring Columbus Circle in
New York City, and another 136 in Times Square.8 By 1997, as part
of then-Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s broad crime-prevention program,
cameras also dotted Central Park, subway stations, and numerous
“high crime” public housing projects.9 As of 2006, there were nearly
4,200 public and private surveillance cameras in lower Manhattan
alone, a five-fold increase from 1998.10 By 2010, the number had
Joe Coscarelli, The NYPD’s Domain Awareness System Is Watching You, NY MAG.
DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 9, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/
2012/08/nypd-domain-awareness-system-microsoft-is-watching-you.html.
2. Coscarelli, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Although the Domain Awareness System was publicly announced in August
2012, there is at least one reference to the use of the system in 2010. See Bob
Hennelly, A Look Inside the NYPD Surveillance System, WNYC NEWS (May 21,
2010), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2010/may/21/a-look-inside-the-nypdsurveillance-system.
6. Coscarelli, supra note 1.
7. Murray Schumach, Police to Use TV to Scan Times Sq. Area for Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 1973, at A1.
8. BILGE YESIL, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: POWER AND PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY
LIFE 41 (2009).
9. Randy Kennedy, Police Cameras Planned for More Housing Projects, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/13/nyregion/police-camerasplanned-for-more-housing-projects.html; David Kocieniewski, Television Cameras
May Survey Public Places, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/
10/06/nyregion/television-cameras-may-survey-public-places.html.
10. YESIL, supra note 8, at 43–44. The use of private surveillance cameras for
government purposes is so common that the distinction is becoming irrelevant. As
Jack Balkin recently noted, “the line between public and private modes of
surveillance blurred if not vanished.” Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the
National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008).
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increased such that if you were in a public space in lower Manhattan,
the odds would be “pretty good” that you were being watched.11 The
same is true of Times Square. As one journalist noted:
In Times Square, perhaps more than any other place in the city, our
movements are being recorded a hundred different ways: from a few
stories up the side of the Bertelsmann building, from inside the plate
glass of the Bank of America branch, as we pass through turnstiles
of a subway station, at the point of purchase in seemingly every
store. . . .
[Cities] used to be places to lose yourself in the thrilling
anonymity of a crowd . . . . It’s hard to adjust to the idea that
cities—New York in particular, and Times Square most of all—are
now places where unseen watchers can monitor your every move.12

The prevalence of surveillance technology is not unique to New
York City.
In Washington, D.C., the Metropolitan Police
Department has plans to consolidate cameras owned by city agencies
(estimated to number more than 5,200) into one network called the
Video Interoperability for Public Safety.13 The network will allow the
police to monitor not only their own cameras, but also those
belonging to other agencies such as the public school system, the
public housing system, and the parks system.14
Chicago’s Operation Virtual Shield includes at least 2,250 cameras,
250 of which have biometric technology.15 Baltimore’s CitiWatch had
at least four hundred cameras equipped with low light, pan, tilt, and
zoom capabilities by 2007.16 Even small towns have turned to camera
surveillance: according to a 2006 survey, at least two hundred towns
and cities in thirty-seven states reported either actual use of video
cameras, or plans for their use.17 In addition to video cameras,

11. Hennelly, supra note 5.
12. Ariel Kaminer, Has the Big Apple Become the Big Eyeball?, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2010, at MB1.
13. D.C. Police Set to Monitor 5000 Cameras, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/apr/9/dc-police-set-to-monitor-5000cameras/.
14. Id.
15. YESIL, supra note 8, at 38.
16. Id. at 35.
17. Charlie Savage, US Doles Out Millions for Street Cameras, BOS. GLOBE, Aug.
12,
2007,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/08/12/
us_doles_out_millions_for_street_cameras/; Lisa Hoffman, Under Surveillance:
Government Spy Cameras Proliferate, FREEDOM WORKS (June 22, 2006),
http://www.freedomworks.org/news/under-surveillance-government-spy-camerasprolifer.
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municipalities may choose to employ license plate readers and
automatic license plate recognition programs that incorporate GPS
data. Financial support for such programs typically comes from the
federal government, which is currently “the principal funder of car
tracking.”18
This is not just an American phenomenon. By some estimates,
Great Britain, “the champion of CCTV surveillance,”19 has access to
between “two and three million cameras . . . creating more video
images per capita than any other country in the world.”20 British
civilians can even earn cash rewards by watching live-streamed CCTV
footage on their home computers and assisting the police in
apprehending criminals.21
Yet, the number of cameras tells only half the story. Cameras
today go well beyond the grainy images we tend to associate with the
cameras used on television programs like America’s Most Wanted.
Today’s cameras are often enhanced by facial recognition
technology.22 As Laura Donohue recently explained:
Complex algorithms measure the size, angle, and distance between
features, enabling identification based on facial characteristics.
Paired with video, this technology allows governments to observe
and record actions in public space and to recall this information for
any number of reasons. Such remote tracking is not the equivalent
of placing a tail on a suspect. It requires no suspicion of any
individual; it functions as warrantless mass surveillance. It is
inexpensive. It has perfect recall. And it generates terabytes of new
knowledge.23

There is even a new device called MORIS—the Mobile Offender
Recognition and Identification System—attachable to an iPhone. It

18. David Rosen, The Police Know Where You’re Driving, SALON (Dec. 6, 2012,
10:24 AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/12/06/the_police_know_where_youre_driving.
19. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places
and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 220 (2002).
20. Id. at 220–21.
21. Internet Eyes, Fighting Crime from Home, ON THE MEDIA (Oct. 8, 2010),
http://www.onthemedia.org/2010/oct/08/internet-eyes-fighting-crime-from-home/
transcript/.
22. See, e.g., Noah Shachtman, The New Security: Cameras that Never Forget
Your Face, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at G6 (discussing New York City’s use of facial
recognition cameras).
23. Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 409
(2012).
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allows an officer, with little more than a wave of his iPhone, to scan
someone’s iris and do facial recognition comparisons.24
For many, the widespread use of cameras conjures images of Big
Brother in George Orwell’s 1984, though the surveillance in Orwell’s
dystopia may seem largely low-tech compared to what exists now. It
is also suggestive of Foucault’s re-imagining of Bentham’s physical
panopticon to a less visible but more oppressive one: that societal
networks themselves are emblematic of a larger carceral society.25
Cameras are everywhere. The question is what to do about it.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROBLEM
The Fourth Amendment, which on its face protects individuals
from government searches, is the source of numerous debates, many
of which concern broad questions about the scope of government
power.
The Fourth Amendment “problem” regarding public
surveillance, however, is actually quite specific. As the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment, monitoring individuals
outside the sanctuary of their homes—as we take the dog for a walk,
drive the kids to soccer practice, or pick up the dry cleaning—simply
is not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.26
This is true whether we are picking up the dry cleaning, running to a
dental appointment, or in fact sneaking off to an adult bookstore or
running drugs.
To fully understand the issue of the lack of regulation of public
surveillance, some understanding of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is useful. Part II.A accordingly provides a brief
overview of Fourth Amendment cases that, at least under any
conventional reading, would seem to leave surveillance cameras
outside of the Fourth Amendment’s purview. Part II.B then offers an
unconventional alternative reading of the amendment.
24. See Christopher R. Jones, “Eyephones”: A Fourth Amendment Inquiry into
Mobile Iris Scanning, 63 S.C. L. REV. 925, 926 (2012).
25. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 280
(Alan Sheridan trans. 1977). Balkin makes a similar point: “During the last part of
the twentieth century the United States began developing a new form of governance
that features the collection, collation, and analysis of information about populations
both in the United States and around the world. This new form of governance is the
National Surveillance State.” Balkin, supra note 10, at 3. Balkin also argues that we
have gone beyond Foucault’s panopticon model: “The Government’s most important
technique of control is no longer watching or threatening to watch. It is analyzing
and drawing connections between data.” Id. at 12.
26. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713–16 (1984); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).
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A. A Conventional Reading of the Fourth Amendment
That surveillance cameras in public are outside the purview of the
Fourth Amendment seems so apparent from one line of Fourth
Amendment cases that it often is accepted as a foregone conclusion.27
Indeed, the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not protect
that which we expose to the public is traceable at least to Katz v.
United States, where the Court in effect retired its trespassdependent test in exchange for a reasonable expectation of privacy
test.28 As the Court put it in that case—which involved the police
surreptitiously using a bug to listen to a private telephone
conversation—“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”29
The line of cases that followed Katz clarified that almost any
knowing exposure to a third party could defeat a claimed reasonable
expectation of privacy.30 Thus, an individual’s bank transactions are
not subject to Fourth Amendment protections; since a third party
(the bank) is necessarily privy to those transactions, an individual
cannot possibly have a reasonable expectation that such transactions
will remain private.31 Similarly, the phone numbers one dials—and
these days possibly texts as well32—are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment; in dialing the numbers, a caller is necessarily
communicating the numbers to a third party (the telephone
company), defeating any reasonable expectation of privacy.33 Nor is
27. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 951, 953 (“The Fourth Amendment does not apply to surveillance in public.”);
Slobogin, supra note 19, at 215 (“If the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by
technological surveillance of a car traveling on public thoroughfares, it is unlikely to
apply to enhancement surveillance of a person walking the streets.”).
28. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29. Id. at 351.
30. While the reasonable expectation of privacy test has predominated since Katz,
the Court has also left in place certain historical distinctions, such as that between the
home (protected), the curtilage (somewhat protected), and open fields (not
protected). See generally United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
31. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976). But see Cal. Bankers Ass’n
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 87–90 (1974).
32. Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J.
1309, 1315 (2012) (observing that “text-messaging systems store copies of what is said
on each endpoint and on network servers in the middle, too”).
33. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). Of course, as Justice Sotomayor has
recently observed, the premise that an individual can never have a reasonable
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one’s subscriber information or one’s web browsing activity
protected; again, the information is being provided to a third party
(the system operator).34 The government can even “search” through
one’s trash bags without having to comply with the Fourth
As Justice White observed in California v.
Amendment.35
Greenwood,36 by placing their rubbish on the curb for pick up by the
municipality’s trash collector, “respondents exposed their garbage to
the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment
protection. It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on
or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”37
The government may even observe one’s activities in a bathroom stall
by looking through a gap in a bathroom stall door, so long as a
hypothetical member of the public could do the same.38 One’s
conversations with a close but duplicitous friend are likewise outside
the purview of the Fourth Amendment.39 “[O]ne contemplating
illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be
reporting to the police.”40

expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to a service provider “is ill
suited to the digital age,” and as such may need to be reconsidered. United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
34. Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[C]omputer users do not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their subscriber information because they
have conveyed it to another person—the system operator.”); United States v.
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007) (ruling that government tracking of which
websites a user visited and whom he exchanged emails with “are constitutionally
indistinguishable from the use of a pen register . . . .”). For a discussion of such
surveillance, see generally Christian David Hammel Schultz, Note, Unrestricted
Federal Agent: “Carnivore” and the Need to Revise the Pen Register Statute, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215 (2001). Indeed, given the wealth of information available
to the government from third parties, the government has access to “digital dossiers”
for each of us. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1084, 1092 (2002); see also Orin S. Kerr, The

Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 829 (2004) (noting that “communications
technologies allow owners and operators of communications networks to build
complete dossiers on their users”).
35. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988); see also United States v.
Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1113 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hedrick, 922 F.2d 396,
400 (7th Cir. 1991).
36. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37.
37. Id. at 40.
38. United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1012 (8th Cir. 1989).
39. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971).
40. Id. at 752.
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Although the Court has not ruled specifically on the government
use of surveillance cameras,41 three cases are close enough that many
scholars deem the issue settled.42 In United States v. Knotts,43 law
enforcement officers investigating Armstrong, a suspected drug
manufacturer, secretly installed a tracking device inside a five-gallon
container of chloroform they expected Armstrong to pick up.44 The
officers then used the tracking device to monitor Armstrong’s
movements in his vehicle, which led the officers to Knotts.45 The
Court rejected Knotts’ claim that the use of the tracking device
amounted to a search, and thus required compliance with the Fourth
Amendment.46 A vehicle, the Court noted, “has little capacity for
escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both
its occupants and its contents are in plain view.”47 Because “[v]isual
surveillance from public places”48 along the route Armstrong took
could have revealed the same information to the police, i.e., since the
information was “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to
look,”49 there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy.50 The
Court added, clearly underestimating the technological advances that
lay ahead, “Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibit[s] the police
41. There is at least one analogous lower court case. In United States v.
Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the use of a surveillance camera in a quasipublic space at a public hospital to monitor a subject was not a Fourth Amendment
search, since the room had large windows through which the target’s actions were
also visible. The court added:
[The defendant] would have us adopt a theory of the Fourth Amendment
akin to J.K. Rowling’s Invisibility Cloak, to create at will a shield
impenetrable to law enforcement view even in the most public places.
However, the fabric of the Fourth Amendment does not stretch that far. He
did not have an expectation of privacy in the public mailroom that society
would accept as reasonable.
328 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2003).
42. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 10, at 20 (“Currently, governments are free to
place cameras in public places like streets and parks because there is no expectation
of privacy there.”); see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the

Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks
Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1357 (2004) (noting that under
contemporary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, pervasive video surveillance “is not
a ‘search’ at all”).
43. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
44. Id. at 278.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 285.
47. Id. at 281 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)).
48. Id. at 282.
49. Id. at 281.
50. Id.
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from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in
this case.”51
The Court reached a similar conclusion in another public tracking
case, United States v. Karo.52 There, the government installed a
tracking device in a can of ether that Karo had ordered from a
government informant and then used the device to track Karo’s
movement to his house and other locations implicating other coconspirators.53 While the Court ruled that using the device to track
movements inside Karo’s house constituted a search subject to Fourth
Amendment protections,54 the use of the device to monitor travel
outside the home, where one could have no reasonable expectation of
privacy, was not.55
Most recently, in United States v. Jones,56 which involved the use of
a GPS tracking device to monitor a target’s movement for thirty days,
the Court reiterated its view that the Fourth Amendment provides no
protection for activities conducted in public. Though the Court
reversed on other grounds—finding a Fourth Amendment violation
because the government trespassed onto a constitutionally protected
area when it attached the tracking device to the suspect’s car—the

51. Id. at 282.
52. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
53. Id. at 708–10.
54. Id. at 716. The Court has always extended the greatest Fourth Amendment
protections to the home, whether it be in the form of requiring arrest warrants for an
arrest in the home, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585–86 (1950), or in requiring
a warrant for almost any search that involves the home. See Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2000) (“‘At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.’” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961))); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211–12 (1981) (requiring a search
warrant to search third-party’s home for suspect). Of course, this enhanced
protection of the home is not without consequences. David Sklansky observes that
treating the home as private means that “leaving one’s home means losing some
privacy—that the price of full privacy is not going out.” David Alan Sklansky, Back
to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and the Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 192 (2002). He
adds that this approach distributes privacy unequally, since those with more money
and larger homes will necessarily have more privacy than those with small homes. Id.
For more on the class implications of the distribution of privacy, see William J.
Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1265 (1999).
55. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713–14.
56. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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Court left intact the general notion that what one exposes in public is
not protected by the Fourth Amendment.57
Although many scholars have criticized this line of cases, they
stand collectively for the proposition that the use of surveillance
cameras to monitor activity that occurs in public is reasonable and
therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment.58 Following the
Supreme Court’s analysis of the issue, the Tenth Circuit held in
United States v. Jackson59 that video cameras installed on telephone
poles are not subject to Fourth Amendment oversight, since such
cameras observe “only what any passerby would easily have been
able to observe.”60 If a constable can stand at a busy intersection or a
cop can walk a beat to make sure no criminal activity is afoot—in
other words, if a law enforcement officer can use his or her eyes to
observe things in public, such as Detective McFadden did in the other
seminal Fourth Amendment case, Terry v. Ohio61—then certainly a
surveillance camera (nothing more than a mechanical cop, a onefunction Robocop62) can do the same thing. Knotts, Karo, and Jones
support this conventional view. Of course, the problem with
conventional thinking is that it tends to be, well, rather conventional.
B.

A Non-Conventional Reading of the Fourth Amendment

The clear implication of the line of Fourth Amendment cases just
described is that the use of technology to monitor the activities of
individuals in public spaces is not subject to the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment.
After all, there can be no reasonable
expectation of privacy—which until recently was the sine qua non of

57. Id. at 951–52 (noting that the Court’s decision does “not deviate[] from the
understanding that mere visual observation does not constitute a search”).
58. Cf. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 101 (4th ed.
2006) (“[T]he implication of Knotts is that as long as monitoring is limited to
movements of persons in non-private areas, the government is free to conduct
constant surveillance of citizens.”); Slobogin, supra note 19, at 215 (“If the Fourth
Amendment is not implicated by technological surveillance of a car traveling on
public thoroughfares, it is unlikely to apply to enhanced surveillance of a person
walking the streets.”).
59. 213 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1033
(2000).
60. Id. at 1281.
61. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
62. I am thinking here of the 1980s film. See ROBOCOP (Orion Pictures 1987).
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Fourth Amendment applicability63—where individuals are in public
and, almost by definition, have “voluntarily conveyed [their activities
in public] to anyone who wanted to look . . . .”64 True, such data will
disclose “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion
clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense
attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque,
synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.”65 But because these
trips are predicated on movement in public, they are constitutionally
unprotected.
But this reading of the Fourth Amendment is not inevitable. This
section offers an alternative reading to reach a different conclusion:
that the use of surveillance cameras in public does implicate
reasonable expectations of privacy, and thus is subject to Fourth
Amendment regulation, requiring either a warrant or at least
reasonableness.
Of course, other scholars have argued that
surveillance should be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation.
Christopher Slobogin, for example, uses empirical evidence to argue
that members of society actually do expect some level of privacy and
even anonymity as they go about their affairs.66 My argument reaches
the same conclusion, but via a different route: through a line of
Supreme Court cases that also begins with Katz, but moreover
includes Katz’s other progeny, United States v. White67 and Alderman
v. United States.68 In short, this reading gives weight to the distinction
the Court makes between an invited ear (White) and an uninvited
one (Katz). The argument is that it is one thing to be observed by a
police officer, even one in plain clothes, who is physically present, but
it is another thing entirely to be observed by a police officer via a
remote video camera, particularly when one is unaware of the
camera. The former scenario is analogous to an invited ear, reconceptualized as an invited eye. The latter is analogous to an
uninvited ear, re-conceptualized as an uninvited eye.
This line of cases also starts with Katz. Recall that in Katz, the
police used an electronic listening device to eavesdrop surreptitiously
63. Although the reasonable expectation test has predominated since Katz, last
term in United States v. Jones, the Court appeared to revive the trespass test that
predated Katz. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012).
64. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
65. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009).
66. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007).
67. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
68. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
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on Katz’s private telephone conversations.69 Rejecting its prior
reliance on the issue of whether there had been a technical trespass
onto a constitutionally protected area, the Court instead asked
whether the agents “violated the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably
relied . . . .”70 Or as more precisely formulated by Justice Harlan in
his now-famous concurrence, whether the defendant had an
expectation of privacy “that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”71 The Court concluded that Katz had such an
expectation, and that accordingly, the FBI violated Katz’s rights by
not complying with constitutional standards and securing a warrant.72
What is significant is that the Court distinguished Katz just a few
years later in a case that also involved the surreptitious recording of
conversations. In United States v. White,73 agents used a listening and
recording device to record White’s conversations. The crucial
difference in the case was that, whereas Katz’s conversations were
monitored and recorded without the consent of any of the involved
parties, White’s conversations were monitored and recorded with the
consent of one the participants—a government informant.74 The
Court thus distinguished between nonconsensual monitoring, which is
subject to Fourth Amendment regulations, and consensual
monitoring, which is not. The Court observed that when a person
enters into a conversation, he assumes the risk that the listener may
report the conversation to another person, including a police officer.75
As such, there can be no legitimate expectation of privacy. Nor can
there be any legitimate expectation that a listener would not also
record the conversation:
Concededly, a police agent who conceals his police connections
may write down for official use his conversations with a defendant
and testify concerning them, without a warrant, authorizing his
encounters with the defendant and without otherwise violating the
latter’s Fourth Amendment rights. For constitutional purposes, no
different result is required if the agent instead of immediately
reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant, either

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
Id. at 353.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 359.
401 U.S. 745 (1971). White, in turn, was consistent with two earlier cases,
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1967) and On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747 (1952).
74. White, 401 U.S. at 746–47.
75. See id. at 750.
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(1) simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he
is carrying on his person, (2) or carries radio equipment which
simultaneously transmits the conversations either to recording
equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the
transmitting frequency. If the conduct and revelations of an agent
operating without electronic equipment do not invade the
defendant’s constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy,
neither does a simultaneous recording of the same conversations
made by the agent or by others from transmissions received from
the agent to whom the defendant is talking and whose
trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks.76

In short, the Court distinguished between the invited ear, for which
citizens assume some risk, and the uninvited ear, for which citizens do
not, though the term “invited” has never fully captured the relevant
distinction. Eavesdropping is unregulated so long as a duplicitous ear
is actually present. For example, if two criminals dine in a restaurant,
it doesn’t matter whether one of them is surreptitiously recording the
conversation, or whether their waiter or an adjacent diner is
recording what they can overhear of the conversation. Because the
duplicitous ear is physically present, the recorded conversation will be
deemed consensual and outside the regulation of the Fourth
Amendment. By contrast, a bug simply planted in a vase on the table
does trigger Fourth Amendment regulation, at least when no
duplicitous ear is actually present. In other words, while Supreme
Court precedent makes clear that citizens must assume the risk that
any person in earshot will turn out to be duplicitous, amounting to a
visible bug,77 citizens need not assume the risk that there will be bugs
even when no one around is duplicitous.78 A majority of state courts
make the same distinction.79
It is precisely this interstitial space that provides a foundation for
subjecting covert public surveillance to Fourth Amendment
76. Id.
77. The term “visible bug” comes from Dressler, who uses it to describe a false
friend with an invisible purpose. See DRESSLER, supra note 58, § 7.05[A].
78. This is not to suggest that this distinction is logical or even inevitable. As
Stephen Saltzburg and Daniel Capra rhetorically put it, “Why does a person assume
the risk that a friend will record an incriminating conversation, but not the risk that
the government will use a wiretap and record an incriminating conversation?”
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND COMMENTARY 475 (7th ed. 2004).
79. See United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1217, 1225 (7th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Stone, 305 F. Supp. 75, 77 (D.D.C. 1969); People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d
505, 511–12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); cf. Kee v. City of Rowlett, Tex., 247 F.3d 206, 213
(5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977).
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protections. Even though the Court has made clear that a person
must assume the risk that an ear is duplicitous, the Court has also
drawn a line.
The crucial factor in determining whether
eavesdropping is a Fourth Amendment search is not only whether the
ear was invited or not. It is also important to inquire whether the ear
is actually, physically, or corporeally present. Thus, in Alderman v.
United States,80 the Fourth Amendment was violated when an
informant, the proverbial invited ear, planted a listening device to
monitor third-party conversations.81
While the informant was
permitted to record conversations in his presence without offending
the Fourth Amendment, that permission ceased the moment he was
no longer physically present.82 The Ninth Circuit applied similar
reasoning to non-consensual video surveillance, albeit in a non-public
location, in United States v. Nerber.83 There, informants used a
hidden video camera to film a narcotics transaction, and the camera
continued to record when they were absent from the room.84 The
audio portion of the recording clearly violated Title III, which
governs interceptions of oral communications. Turning to the video
portion, the court held that this recording violated the defendants’
rights under the Fourth Amendment, since it is not reasonable to
think that one will be subject to video surveillance by a false friend
who is not actually present.85
I mention the line of cases from Katz to Alderman to White
because their arc suggests a different outcome in any analysis of
surveillance cases. It suggests that it is not the hypothetical presence
of a law enforcement officer that should matter, but rather the actual
presence. It suggests that just as citizens are not required to assume
the risk that they will be monitored by a listening device when no
duplicitous ear is actually present—indeed, the very situation in

80. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
81. Id. at 179–80.
82. See also United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 1983)
(approving use of fixed monitoring devices as long as they are only activated when a
consenting party is present). This is consistent with the Wiretap Act, which regulates
the law enforcement interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications. See
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2006); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-7.302 (2012). It should be noted that the Wiretap Act
does not apply to silent video. See United States v. Larios, 593 F.3d 82, 90 (1st Cir.
2010); United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 679–80 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1992).
83. 222 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2000).
84. Id. at 599.
85. Id.
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Katz—citizens are not required to assume the risk that they will be
monitored by a watching device when no duplicitous eye is actually
present. Instead of suggesting that a person on a public street does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared
to recognize, the answer is the opposite.86
This is not to say that there are not other cases that might support a
right to privacy in the public surveillance context. As others have
noted, Knotts left open the possibility that “dragnet” surveillance
would offend the Fourth Amendment.87 In Kyllo v. United States,88
which involved the government use of a thermal imaging device on a
suspect’s home, the Court also expressed its concern about the
growing use of technology to engage in surveillance.89 Even Judge
Posner, who has written that tailing a suspect and using video
surveillance to do the same are functionally equivalent for Fourth
Amendment purposes, has recognized that a different result might be
compelled should the police engage in “wholesale surveillance,”
writing:
It would be premature to rule that such a program of mass
surveillance could not possibly raise a question under the Fourth
Amendment—that it could not be a search because it would merely
be an efficient alternative to hiring another ten million police
officers to tail every vehicle on the nation’s roads.90

And based on the Court’s recent decision in Jones, it seems that
the five members of the Court are open to reading the Fourth
Amendment as imposing some limits on long-term, warrantless
surveillance, at least when such surveillance is targeted at a particular
individual.91 My point here is not to preclude an argument for the
regulation of public surveillance based on these cases. Rather, my

86. Another analogy is to the restroom surveillance cases. Courts recognize a
distinction between an officer peering through a bathroom stall door to observe
illegal activity, and the use of a covert surveillance camera to observe illegal activity.
The former, because an actual eye is present, is not a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1012 (8th Cir.
1989). By contrast, the latter is a search subject to Fourth Amendment regulation.
See, e.g., Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 1116–17 (E.D. Pa. 1975); People v.
Triggs, 506 P.2d 232 (1973).
87. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983).
88. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
89. Id.
90. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).
91. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring);
id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[L]onger term GPS monitoring in investigations of
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”).
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point is to suggest another route to privacy, one that flows naturally
from Katz, White, and Alderman.
Of course, to say that camera surveillance is subject to Fourth
Amendment regulation is only the first step. That statement neither
answers whether probable cause or a warrant is required or whether
such surveillance need only comply with the reasonableness clause of
the Fourth Amendment. Several factors suggest that reasonableness
will suffice.
For one, mass surveillance neither restricts the
movement of individuals nor interferes with any tangible property
rights.92 While it is true that overt surveillance may chill movement
somewhat, that intrusion is de minimis.93 And when such surveillance
is covert, the intrusion is non-existent. By contrast, the surveillance
serves a substantial public interest. Overt surveillance deters crime;
covert surveillance aids in solving crime once it occurs. Moreover, it
does so in a way that mere manpower, given limited resources,
cannot. In addition, such surveillance responds to special needs
beyond law enforcement, insofar as it serves the larger purpose of
ensuring public safety—a concern that has become all the more acute
since 9/1194—and is applied in a non-arbitrary or non-discriminatory
manner. The Court has held that such special needs searches are
almost by default reasonable.95
92. It is straightforward that a camera does not have the ability to either stop you
from walking or driving, or to seize something from your person. Maybe, in some
Orwellian sense, a person might feel more inhibited in their movements, but I think
the practical import of the situation supersedes any overly dystopic musings.
93. Indeed, overt surveillance may not constitute a Fourth Amendment search at
all, since an individual who knows that he is being watched cannot have an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize. To the extent that an
individual has choice in whether to travel on roads that he knows to be subject to
surveillance, the individual’s consent would appear to further render any surveillance
reasonable. Cf. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1990) (“There are various
elements . . . that can make a search [reasonable]—one of which is the consent of the
person . . . .”); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (although
voluntary consent does not function as a waiver, it does function to render a search
reasonable).
94. It is telling that the Domain Awareness System in New York City emphasizes
counterterrorism in its statement of purpose. See N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, DOMAIN
AWARENESS SYSTEM PUBLIC SECURITY PRIVACY GUIDELINES (2009), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_prevention/public_security_priv
acy_guidelines.pdf.
95. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444 (1990) (applying special needs test to permit highway sobriety
checkpoint); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (permitting
highway checkpoints to search for illegal aliens). For more on the “special needs”
exception, see Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 254 (2011).
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What are the implications of this approach? It suggests that cities
and towns would have some flexibility in using cameras as tools of
crime control and public safety. Indeed, it suggests that one check, in
addition to the judicial check, will be the democratic process itself.96
For example, using a reasonableness test, society might conclude
that it is perfectly reasonable to maintain surveillance cameras in a
location deemed to be a terrorist target, such as Times Square.
Indeed, it was such surveillance cameras that contributed to the arrest
of Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to detonate a bomb in Times
Square in 2010.97 Conversely, it may not be reasonable, in Fourth
Amendment terms, to maintain surveillance cameras at a Lover’s
Lane. Cameras in high crime areas may be reasonable; cameras
outside the local strip club, or inside public restrooms, likely are not
reasonable.
In sum, while a conventional reading of Fourth Amendment
cases—at least the line of cases from Katz to Jones—would suggest
that the use of camera surveillance in public is not subject to Fourth
Amendment regulation, a nonconventional reading suggests
otherwise. By considering another line of cases, from Katz to White,
a strong argument can be made that camera surveillance in public is
in fact subject to Fourth Amendment regulation. In addition, a
balancing of the intrusion to the individual and the needs of the
public suggests that such surveillance will comply with the Fourth
Amendment so long as such surveillance is reasonable.98
96. On the role of the democratic process as providing a check on law
enforcement overreach, especially when the “law-abiding” majority is affected, see
Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 131
(2010); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 588 (1992) (“Fourth Amendment regulation is
usually unnecessary where large numbers of affected parties are involved. Citizens
can protect themselves in the same way that they protect themselves against most
kinds of government misconduct—they can throw the rascals out.”). This is also
consistent with Orin Kerr’s view that legislative bodies, not courts, should do the
heavy lifting in terms of regulating the state’s use of technology vis-à-vis its citizens.
See Kerr, supra note 34, at 806.
97. William Saletan, Luck Tape: Surveillance Cameras and the Times Square
Bombing, SLATE (May 4, 2010, 1:39 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
health_and_science/human_nature/2010/05/luck_tape.html.
98. Christopher Slobogin, in his thoughtful response to my argument, rightfully
observes that my unconventional reading is predicated on the assumption that no
actual duplicitous eye is present. This assumption is weaker, he points out, when in
fact human eyes—albeit non-duplicitous ones—are present, and when the
surveillance system includes notice. In these situations, the mere presence of an
actual eye, even if not duplicitous, or noticed, would seem to be enough to render the
surveillance a non-search under the Court’s longstanding “assumption of risk”
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In a way, of course, it is curious that I am pushing for any
regulation of surveillance, since as the next Part makes clear, I am in
favor of more surveillance, not less. Perhaps the best way of stating
my position is this: I want more surveillance, but I want that
surveillance to be reasonable. Why am I pushing for more public
surveillance? To be sure, such surveillance can do significant work in
preventing crime and apprehending criminals. Though contested, this
work is well known and so I do not recite it here. But there is other
work that surveillance does—work that has not been sufficiently
attended to or factored into the equation. That work includes
combating police abuses, whether such abuses are in the form of
excessive force, or the repeated micro-aggressions that result from
racial profiling.99 There is yet another reason I am pushing for more
public surveillance: because I believe in listening to communities.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SOLUTION
It is now quite common for civil libertarians and Fourth
Amendment scholars to decry this state of under-regulated mass
surveillance. Slobogin describes mass surveillance as “an insidious
assault on our freedom”100 that threatens our ability “to express what
we believe, to do what we want to do, to be the type of person we
really are.”101 The American Bar Association has proposed a range of
rationale. See Christopher Slobogin, Community Control over Camera Surveillance,
40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 993, 994 (2013). While I do not entirely disagree with
Slobogin, I cannot but hope that the Court would look at mass surveillance cases
differently. There is something fundamental about having to travel in public,
rendering any suggestion that one “voluntarily” assumes the risk of being observed in
public weak indeed. Put differently, imagine a city where surveillance cameras are
literally everywhere. Can we really say the inhabitants of the city have assumed the
risk of being observed in public, or is it more accurate to say that they have no
choice? I am reminded here of a case I teach in my Criminal Law class, Pottinger v.
City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992), where the court enjoined the
enforcement of laws that prohibited sleeping or bathing in public, where the laws
were used to arrest the homeless, and the enforcement of such laws in effect
penalized them for performing essential, life-sustaining acts. Just as sleeping or
bathing in public ceases to be a choice for those who are truly homeless, going out in
public (or directing someone else to go out in public on your behalf) ceases to be a
choice for most of us.
99. I borrow this term from Peggy Davis, who uses it to describe the ways in
which minorities often are subjected to “stunning, automatic acts of disregard that
stem from unconscious attitudes of [superiority],” which in turn has led many
minorities to view the legal system as biased. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as
Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1576 (1989).
100. SLOBOGIN, supra note 66, at ix (2007).
101. Id. at 4.
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requirements that must be met before law enforcement agencies can
use surveillance.102 And civil liberties groups routinely criticize the
use of such surveillance.103 On the other side of the debate, law and
order advocates argue that mass surveillance is a necessary tool in
deterring crime and apprehending criminals.
The goal of this Part is not to settle the debate, but rather to call
attention to other benefits of mass surveillance that should be
considered. This Part also urges that we listen to communities.104 For
many communities, public surveillance has the potential to do more
than simply deter crime and aid in the apprehension of lawbreakers.105 Public surveillance can also function to monitor the
police, reduce racial profiling, curb police brutality, and ultimately
increase perceptions of legitimacy. The issue thus becomes not how
we can use the Fourth Amendment to limit public surveillance, but
rather how we can use the Fourth Amendment to harness public
surveillance’s full potential.
The potential benefits of surveillance cameras become apparent
when we consider two aspects of policing that I have written about
previously: racial profiling and police brutality.106 Consider racial
profiling. As I have argued before, here the numbers are the issue.107
Recent numbers from New York City’s stop-and-frisk initiative are
particularly revealing. In New York, African Americans and
Hispanics constitute over 80% of the individuals stopped, a
percentage far greater than their representation in the population.108

102. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: PART B: TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL
SURVEILLANCE (3d ed. 1999).
103. See, e.g., Hennelly, supra note 5 (noting NYCLU protests).
104. On the advantages of listening to communities, see Dan M. Kahan & Tracey
L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998);
Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking:
A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197.
105. Of course, as Alafair Burke points out in her contribution to this Colloquium,
identifying just one community is difficult and often contested. See Alafair Burke,
Policing, Protestors, and Discretion, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999, 1014–15 (2013). For
more on the problem of locating a “community,” see Regina Austin, “The Black
Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1769 (1992).
106. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835 (2008).
107. I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and
the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 14 (2011).
108. Blacks and Hispanics make up approximately 54% of the New York City
population. See State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2013).

CAPERS_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

6/26/2013 8:31 PM

2013] CRIME, SURVEILLANCE, & COMMUNITIES

979

Moreover, of the African Americans stopped, 95% were not engaged
in activity warranting arrest.109 When considered as a percentage of
the population, the numbers are even more jarring. Stops of whites, if
spread across the population of New York City, would amount to
stops of approximately 2.6% of the white population during the
period.110 By contrast, stops of blacks, if spread across the population,
would amount to stops of approximately 21.1% of the population.111
Moreover, a significant number of these stops have been found to be
unjustified,112 prompting a class action lawsuit against the New York
City Police Department.113
While the numbers above concern the racial profiling of
pedestrians, the profiling that drivers suffer is perhaps even more
well-known. In Whren v. United States,114 the Supreme Court
sanctioned such pretextual stops so long as a traffic violation could
provide a legal justification.115 A report compiled by the Maryland
State Police revealed that, during the period examined, African
Americans comprised 72.9% of all of the drivers stopped and
searched along a stretch of Interstate 95, even though they comprised
only 17.5% of the drivers violating traffic laws on the road,116 and
109. Between January 1, 2006 and September 30, 2007, the New York City Police
Department completed stop-and-frisk forms for 867,617 individuals. Of that number,
453,042 were black, and another 30% were Hispanic, numbers grossly
disproportionate to their representation in the general public. Only one in every 21.5
blacks stopped was engaged in activity warranting arrest. Put another way, of the
453,053 stop-and-frisk forms police officers completed for black suspects,
approximately 402,943 were for stopping and frisking blacks not engaged in unlawful
activity warranting arrest. See Analysis of New NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Data, ACLU
(Nov. 26, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/analysis-new-nypd-stop-and-friskdata-reveals-dramatic-impact-black-new-yorkers.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Al Baker & Ray Rivera, Thousands of Street Stops by New York Police Were
Legally Unjustified, a Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2010, at A22.
113. Al Baker, Judge Grants Class-Action Status to Stop-and-Frisk Suit, N.Y.
TIMES CITY ROOM (May 16, 2012, 11:23 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/05/16/judge-allows-class-action-status-in-stop-and-frisk-lawsuit/.
114. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In Whren, the Court rejected a Fourth Amendment
challenge to a pretextual car stop designed to search for drugs and other contraband,
“conclu[ding] that so long as the stop itself was based on an actual traffic violation,
the subjective motivation of an officer in singling out a particular motorist is
irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 862. By so holding, the Court
essentially “green-lighted the police practice of singling out minorities for pretextual
traffic stops in the hope of discovering contraband.” Capers, supra note 106, at 862.
115. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
116. See DAVID A. HARRIS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR
NATION’S HIGHWAYS 14 (1999), available at http://www.aclu.org/racial-
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even though the hit rate for blacks, i.e., the rate at which contraband
was found, was statistically identical to the hit rates for whites.117
Similar findings have been made of traffic stops in Illinois,118
Arizona,119 and Los Angeles.120 The Los Angeles study, spearheaded
by Ian Ayres, is particularly noteworthy. Controlling for variables
such as the rate of violent and property crimes, Professor Ayres found
that the stop rate was 3,400 stops higher per 10,000 residents for
blacks than for whites, and almost 360 stops higher for Hispanics than
for whites,121 notwithstanding the fact that blacks were 37% less likely
to be found with weapons than searched whites, and 24% less likely
to be found with drugs than searched whites.122 Similar numbers were
found for searched Hispanics: Hispanics were 33% less likely to be
found with weapons than searched whites, and 34% less likely to be
found with drugs than searched whites.123
Statistics also suggest that law-abiding minorities face the brunt of
the additional discretionary decision-making permitted officers upon
conducting a stop.124 Traffic stops, which are already largely

justice/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways. But this is not to
suggest that hit rates tell the whole story. For example, hit rates reveal nothing about
the quantity (personal use or distribution use) or type of contraband seized. For
critiques of the use of hit rates, see R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race,
Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 585 (2003); Katherine Y. Barnes,

Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction Absent Racial
Profiling, 54 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1098 (2005); Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial
Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature,
and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1276–77
(2004).
117. John Knowles, Nicola Perisco & Peter Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle
Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 UNIV. OF CHI. J. POL. ECON. 203, 219 (2011).
118. See, e.g., ALEXANDER WEISS & DENNIS P. ROSENBAUM, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI.
CTR. FOR RESEARCH IN LAW & JUSTICE, ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS STUDY
2008 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2009), available at http://www.dot.state.il.us/
trafficstop/results08.html.
119. ACLU OF ARIZ., DRIVING WHILE BLACK OR BROWN (2008), available at
http://acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/DrivingWhileBlackOrBrown.pdf. I use
“pretextual traffic stops” here to refer to stops based on valid traffic violations where
the primary purpose of the stop is to seek contraband or otherwise uncover criminal
behavior.
120. IAN AYRES, RACIAL PROFILING AND THE LAPD: A STUDY OF RACIALLY
DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (2008), available
at http://www.aclu-sc.org/issues/police-practices/racial-profiling-the-lapd.
121. Id. at 27.
122. Id. at 7–8.
123. Id. at 8.
124. David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 NW. U. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
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discretionary,125 permit officers the further discretion to order
occupants out of the vehicle,126 to engage in questioning unrelated to
the traffic stop,127 to request consent to a search,128 and without
consent to conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle.129 In certain
jurisdictions, officers even have the discretion to make a custodial
arrest based on the traffic violation.130 Who is ordered out of a
vehicle, who is subject to questioning unrelated to the traffic stop,
who is searched, and so on, are strongly correlated to race.131 As I
have argued elsewhere, all of this is citizenship-diminishing,
suggesting a racial hierarchy inconsistent with our professed goal of
equal citizenship.132
And yet racial profiling remains largely
133
unaddressed.
544, 560–62 (1997); see also Barnes, supra note 116, at 1113 (police search vehicles
driven by blacks 2.6 times more frequently than vehicles driven by whites).
125. Traffic codes grant officers both affirmative and negative choices. Most
motorists drive above the speed limit. What this means in terms of affirmative and
negative choice is that, setting aside resources and feasibility, law enforcement
officers have the discretion to stop all motorists, some motorists, or indeed no
motorists exceeding the speed limit. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling out the Rule of
Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1516–30 (2007) (arguing that specific laws do not
necessarily resolve the problem of discretion that plagues vague laws, since even
specific laws continue to invest officers with negative choice, i.e., the choice not to
enforce the law or make an arrest); see also Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not

to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of
Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 552 (1960) (“[P]olice decisions not to invoke the criminal
process, except when reflected in gross failure of service, are not visible to the
community.”).
126. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (passengers); Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (drivers).
127. See Harris, supra note 124, at 574; see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323,
333 (2009) (“An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the
traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something
other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the
duration of the stop.”).
128. See Harris, supra note 124, at 546.
129. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2004); United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696 (1983).
130. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
131. For extensive data on search (as opposed to stop) disparity, see Samuel R.
Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on
the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 561, 663–69 (2002). In terms of how minority drivers
and passengers are treated, see, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, Question of Race Profiling
Unanswered, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2006, at B3. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, Justice
Stevens anticipated that officers are likely to use race not only as a factor in deciding
whom to stop, but also whom to order out of a vehicle. See 434 U.S. at 122 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
132. Capers, supra note 107, at 19; see also Wendy Ruderman, Rude or Polite,
City’s Officers Leave Raw Feelings in Stops, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2012, at A1;
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Consider, too, the police use of excessive force. Although there is
no way to determine with mathematic certainty how often police use
excessive or unnecessary force, studies suggest that such use is far
from infrequent.134 Furthermore, studies indicate that the police are
more likely to engage in force when dealing with members of
outgroups (those who are poor or minority or gender nonconforming) than when dealing with members of ingroups.135 Social
cognition research examining implicit biases and the use of force also
suggests that police are more likely to open fire on minorities, and
conversely withhold fire on whites, even when the suspects are
engaged in identical behavior.136 In addition, several high-profile
Wendy Ruderman, For Women in Street Stops, Deeper Humiliation, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2012, at A1.
133. See Kami Chavis Simmons, Beginning to End Racial Profiling: Definitive
Solutions to an Elusive Problem, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 25, 28
(2011).
134. Findings by the NAACP, based on hearings conducted in minority
communities across the country following the police beating of Rodney King,
indicate that many minorities do not file formal complaints against officers out of fear
of reprisal, or discouragement, or the belief that their complaints will not be believed.
See CHARLES OGLETREE ET AL., BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY 52–54 (1995).
Studies by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International confirm that police
brutality is in fact widespread. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH available at
www.hrw.org/reports98/police/uspo06.htm; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
REPORT 1998—UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA
(1998),
available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa0c38.html. A study of Bronx residents reported
that 25% of a cross-section of residents reported witnessing police brutality or
harassment during an arrest. See James R. Davis, A Comparison of Attitudes
Toward the New York City Police, 17 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 233 (1990).
135. There is evidence that police are more likely to use deadly force during
encounters with minority suspects. Such evidence was brought to the Supreme
Court’s attention in Tennessee v. Garner in which the Court analyzed Fourth
Amendment limitations on the use of deadly force. See Brief for AppelleeRespondent at 23–26, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (Nos. 83-1035, 831070), 1984 WL 566020 (citing statistical data showing “significant disparities in the
use of deadly force based on the race of the shooting victim/suspect and that virtually
all of this disparity occurs as a result of the Memphis policy that allows officers to
exercise their discretion to shoot fleeing property crime suspects.”).
136. See Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1314, 1315–19 (2002). Significantly, there was no correlation between
shooter bias and explicit bias, as determined by a questionnaire to ascertain the
participant’s personal views about blacks. There was, however, a correlation
between shooter bias and implicit bias, as ascertained by the participant’s assessment
of how other whites viewed blacks. Id. at 1321; see also John A. Bargh et al.,

Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype
Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 238–39 (1996). For
further discussion of these and other social cognition experiments suggesting the
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cases of excessive force—Rodney King,137 Amadou Diallo,138 Abner
Louima,139 and the shooting deaths of two men during Hurricane
Katrina140—contribute to the perception, at least in minority
communities,141 that the use of excessive force against minorities is
endemic.142
pervasiveness of implicit racial bias in policing, see L. Song Richardson, Arrest
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011).
137. Police officers beat King with billy clubs and stunned him with a Taser “stun
gun” during a traffic stop. See Hector Tobar & Richard Lee Colvin, Witnesses Depict

Relentless Beating; Police Accounts of Rodney Glen King’s Arrest Describe
Repeated Striking and Kicking of the Suspect. LAPD Officers Said King’s Actions
Justified the Treatment, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at B1; Seth Mydans, Videotaped
Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at
A1. As a result of this beating, King suffered nine skull fractures, a shattered eye
socket and cheekbone, a broken leg, a concussion, injuries to both knees and nerve
damage that left his face partly paralyzed.
138. Diallo, an unarmed immigrant from Guinea, was standing in the vestibule of
his apartment building in the Bronx when he was shot forty-one times by an all-white
squad of the NYPD’s Street Crime Unit. Evidence suggests that Diallo was reaching
for his wallet to identify himself when he was shot. See Michael Cooper, Officers in
Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Unarmed Man Is Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1;
Amy Waldman, A Hard Worker with a Gentle Smile, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at
B5.
139. On August 9, 1997, Louima was arrested following a verbal altercation with a
police officer, Justin Volpe, during which another individual struck Volpe, knocking
him down. Volpe responded by striking Louima repeatedly en route to the police
precinct, and by taking Louima into a bathroom where he forced a broken
broomstick six inches into Louima’s rectum. Louima required three operations and
two months of hospitalization. Officer Justin Volpe pleaded guilty to sodomizing
Louima, and Officer Charles Schwarz was convicted by a jury of aiding in the assault.
See David Barstow, Officer, Seeking Mercy, Admits to Louima’s Torture, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 1999, at A1; Joseph P. Fried, Volpe Sentenced to a 30-Year Term in
Louima Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at A1.
140. See Shaila Dewan, Police Officers Charged in Deaths in Hurricane’s
Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2006, at A18; Campbell Robertson, Officers Guilty
of Shooting Six in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/us/06danziger.html.
141. See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,
1120 (2008) (discussing racialized “pools of knowledge”).
142. For example, a poll released by the Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies found that 43% of blacks believe police brutality and harassment are serious
problems. Among the general public, the figure agreeing with this belief was only
13%. See Michael A. Fletcher, Study Tracks Blacks’ Crime Concerns; African
Americans Show Less Confidence in System, Favor Stiff Penalties, WASH. POST, Apr.
21, 1996, at A11. This is not to suggest that blacks are the only minority group
victimized by police brutality. See, e.g., COMMITTEE AGAINST ANTI-ASIAN
VIOLENCE, POLICE VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK CITY’S ASIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES,
1986–1995, at 4–11 (1996) (noting the annual increase in reports of police violence
against Asian Americans). Gays and lesbians, especially those of color and those
who fail to conform to gender expectations, have also been the victims of police
brutality.
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Equally troubling, the use of excessive force tends to be underpoliced. Even when indictments are brought, convictions are rarely
obtained. The initial acquittal of the officers charged in the Rodney
King beating is the rule, not the exception. Even when the officers
were retried on federal charges, only two of the four were convicted,
and at sentencing the court granted their motions for sentencing
departures, which were affirmed in Koon v. United States.143 The
officers in the Diallo shooting were acquitted of all charges.144
Despite overwhelming evidence of complicity by other officers, only
two officers were convicted of charges related to the sodomy of
Louima. This suggests, and certainly contributes to the perception,
that officers themselves operate in a zone of underenforcement.
Now consider the work camera surveillance can do to address these
issues. First, take the racial profiling of minority drivers. Cameras
already monitor automated bridge and tunnel tolling systems,145 and
photo-radars already catch red-light violations.146 But this is only the
start. As Elizabeth Joh has explored, technology already exists to
police almost all traffic violations.147
Dedicated short-range
communications technology (DSRC) means that cars are increasingly
being equipped to communicate pertinent data to other devices,
including data regarding the car’s location and speed, and warnings
regarding the car’s mechanics or registration.148 While DSRC is
already being used to reduce collisions—by alerting a driver that
another car is approaching, for example—this same technology can be
used to generate automatic traffic tickets.149 Clearly, such automated
surveillance has the potential to free police to focus on actual
policing. But more importantly, it has the advantage of being racially
neutral.150 Rather than using pretext stops to single out minority
motorists, surveillance technology will “ticket” without regard to
race. I have argued in other work that racial profiling does more than
143. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
144. Jane Fritsch, 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at A1.
145. See, e.g., Mike Frassinelli, Nearly 4 of 5 NJ Turnpike Drivers use E-ZPass,
Officials Say, NJ.COM, June 26, 2012 (referring to the use of video surveillance to
ticket toll dodgers).
146. Steven Tafoya Naumchick, Stop! Photographic Enforcement of Red Lights,
30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 833, 834 (1999).
147. Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 199 (2007).
148. Id. at 200.
149. Id. at 220–21.
150. Id. at 221–23.
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simply impose a “racial tax,” as Randall Kennedy suggests.151 In fact,
racial profiling, as a marker of inequality, is citizenship-diminishing.152
Cameras, by contrast, neither discriminate nor engage in arbitrary
policing.153 They treat all traffic offenders alike and therefore are
citizenship-enhancing.
And this is only the start. Consider the issue of the racial profiling
of pedestrians. Camera surveillance, to the extent it deters crime,
reduces the justification frequently offered by the police for engaging
in so many stops. Beyond that, cameras provide a record to either
support the proffered basis for a stop and/or frisk, or to expose the
proffered basis to be false.154 It is telling that a “Stop and Frisk
Watch” app, designed for the New York Civil Liberties Union,
already helps individuals document citizen-police interactions.155
Likewise, audio surveillance already has exposed inappropriate stopand-frisk tactics.156 Indeed, the use of surveillance cameras could do
the work of ferreting out particular “bad apples” in police
departments.157
151. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 159 (1998); see also JODY
DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF
BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13–14 (1997) (discussing a “black tax”).
152. Capers, supra note 107, at 19–29.
153. I am setting aside the issue of discriminatory placement of cameras.
154. As Susan Sontag observed several decades ago, “Photographs furnish
evidence. Something we hear about, but doubt, seems proven when we’re shown a
photograph of it. . . . [There exists a] presumption of veracity that gives all
photographs authority.” SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 5–6 (1977). Of course,
this is not to suggest that photographs cannot be manipulated. See WILLIAM J.
MITCHELL, THE RECONFIGURED EYE: VISUAL TRUTH IN THE POST-PHOTOGRAPHIC
ERA (1992). Nor is it to suggest that observers will always agree on a photograph’s
“truth,” as a recent study on how different groups interpreted a video of a high-speed
chase shows. See Dan M. Kahan, et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?
Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009).
For more on how even surveillance footage “does not lie . . . [but also cannot] tell the
whole story,” see Jessica Silbey, Persuasive Visions: Film and Memory, L. CULTURE
& HUMAN. 3 (Jan. 19, 2012), http://intl-lch.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/01/06/
1743872111423175.full.pdf.
155. Joshua Brustein, Stop, Frisk, Record, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2012, at MB4.
156. Ross Tuttle & Erin Schneider, Stopped-and-Frisked: ‘For Being a F**cking
Mutt,’ THE NATION (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/170413/stoppedand-frisked-being-fking-mutt-video (audio capture of officer refusing to give valid
reason for stop, instead saying “For being a fucking mutt,” And later threatening,
“I’m gonna break your fuckin’ arm, then I’m gonna punch you in the fuckin’ face”).
157. As Malcolm Gladwell has pointed out in his reporting on the Christopher
Commission’s investigation into excessive violence by the LAPD, often a problem
that seems endemic is in fact the result of a handful of “repeat offenders.” As
Gladwell put it, if you were to graph the perpetrators of excessive force at the LAPD,
“it wouldn’t look like a bell curve. It would look more like a hockey stick.” See

CAPERS_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

986

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

6/26/2013 8:31 PM

[Vol. XL

More importantly, just as cameras deter criminal and other
inappropriate behavior, cameras likely will deter police from
engaging in stops and frisks that cannot be justified by reasonable
suspicion that can be well-articulated. In short, it may deter them
from engaging in inefficient, racialized policing, and induce them to
engage in more efficient policing.158 Such surveillance can also play a
role in encouraging efficient internalized regulations.159 It can also
contribute to what one scholar identifies as a “monitory democracy,”
i.e., the production of accounts of police activities to facilitate public
scrutiny of the state and its actors.160 In short, camera surveillance has
the potential to “increase the police’s accountability to the public,
while decreasing their account ability,”161 or their ability to “patrol the
facts.”162
Camera surveillance has the potential to do similar work when it
comes to the use of excessive force. Again, the presence of cameras
will likely serve as a deterrent. Beyond that, camera surveillance can
document the use of excessive force.163 Indeed, one reason why
several incidents of brutality entered the national conversation—
including the Rodney King beating—is because eyewitnesses
videotaped them.164
Absent such contemporaneous visual
Malcolm Gladwell, Million-Dollar Murray: Why Problems Like Homelessness May
Be Easier to Solve than to Manage, NEW YORKER, Feb. 13, 2006, at 96, 98.
158. On racial profiling’s inefficiency, largely because of what he terms a “ratchet
effect,” see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING
AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 145 (2007); Harcourt, supra note 116, at
1329–34.
159. This proposition is in line with an argument Mary Fan recently made . See
Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police
Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 129 (2012) (“When
police are subject to the watchful gaze of courts, the public, and self-surveillance,
they behave in better conformity with expectations.”).
160. JOHN KEANE, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF DEMOCRACY 739 (2009).
161. Andrew John Goldsmith, Policing’s New Visibility, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY
914, 915 (2010) (emphasis in original). Goldsmith borrows the term “account ability”
from R. Ericson. Richard V. Ericson, The New Media and Account Ability, in
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS 135 (Philip C. Stenning
ed., 1995).
162. Richard V. Ericson, Patrolling the Facts: Secrecy and Publicity in Police
Work, 40 BRIT. J. SOC. 205 (1989).
163. David Harris has made a similar argument in favor of body worn video
devices. See David A. Harris, Picture This: Body Worn Video Devices (Head Cams)
as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 357 (2010).
164. The fatal beating of Nathaniel Jones in Cincinnati, captured on videotape, is
but one example. See Brenna R. Kelly, Man Dies After Brawl with City Police
Officers, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 1, 2003. More recent examples include the
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documentation, the use of excessive force is difficult to prove,
especially when the only witnesses are law enforcement officers and
the complainant. Even when other witnesses are present, the Federal
Rules of Evidence—particularly Rule 609—can function to tip the
scales against the complainant.165 Camera surveillance can become
another tool in leveling the playing field. Again, they can either
support the claim of excessive force, or undermine the claim.166
All of this points to another advantage: legitimacy. Legitimacy
theory suggests that individuals are more likely to voluntarily comply
with the law when they perceive the law to be legitimate and applied
in a non-discriminatory fashion.167 Camera surveillance, to the extent
it does not discriminate, and to the extent it confirms or refutes police
misconduct, is likely to increase perceptions of legitimacy. And as I
pepper spraying of sitting protesters in U.C. Davis, the fatal beating of a homeless
man in Fullerton, California, and the assault of a cyclist. See Ian Lovett, Death of
Homeless Man After Beating by Police Stirs Outrage in California, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
4, 2011, at A17; Sewell Chan, Police Investigate Officer in Critical Mass Video, N.Y.
TIMES CITY ROOM (July 28, 2008, 5:07 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/07/28/police-investigate-officer-in-critical-mass-video/; Brian Stelter, Officers
Placed on Leave after Pepper-Spraying Protesters, N.Y. TIMES LEDE(Nov. 20, 2011),
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/officers-put-on-leave-after-pepperspraying-protesters/. Some of this implicates the right of individuals to record the
police. For a discussion of this right, see Steven A. Lautt, Note, Sunlight Is Still the
Best Disinfectant: The Case for a First Amendment Right to Record the Police, 51
WASHBURN L.J. 349 (2012).
165. See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, Our Criminal Network, and The
Wire, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 459, 465–67 (2011) (discussing impact of Federal Rule of
Evidence 609 in police brutality cases).
166. Lolita Buckner Inniss makes a similar argument:
[V]ideo surveillance sometimes provides much needed valorization for . . .
less regarded private people [those possessing little power or authority].
This is because private people are far more often lied about, lied to and
deemed liars. Hence private people often lose in battles of opposing
narratives with public people about what has occurred. In such cases, video
surveillance becomes a mostly neutral, unlikely to lie, legitimizing witness.
For many of these private people, especially women, people of color or
other relatively powerless people in society, video surveillance is the
modern day white witness.
Lolita Buckner Innis, Video Surveillance as White Witnesses, AIN’T I A FEMINIST
LEGAL SCHOLAR TOO? (Sept. 30, 2012, 5:27 PM), http://innissfls.blogspot.com/
2012/09/video-surveillance-as-white-witnesses.html.
167. No scholar has been more influential in exploring the role that perceptions of
legitimacy play in voluntary compliance than Tom Tyler. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002); Tom
R. Tyler & Cheryl Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice,
Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253
(2004).
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have detailed elsewhere, the benefits of increased legitimacy are
manifold.168 Individuals will be more likely to voluntarily comply with
the law.169 And individuals will be more likely to “perform their duty
as citizens” and voluntarily assist the police in maintaining an ordered
society.170
Such surveillance can also serve to educate the public at large.
Polls continue to show that minorities and non-minorities have very
different perceptions about the police.171 This is not to say that either
group is wrong, but rather it suggests that it is difficult to be aware of
what one does not see. Surveillance recording can make the use of
excessive force or profiling “real” to those who, because of race or
class, will likely never experience it.172 This, in turn, can induce those
individuals to “buy in” to increased reforms to make policing more
egalitarian.
Finally, there is the fundamental issue of crime prevention. But my
argument here is slightly different from the usual “law and order”
argument of surveillance advocates.
My argument turns to
communities, especially those hit hardest by crime. To be sure, the
complaint in such communities is about over-enforcement in the form
of police harassment, profiling, and excessive force.
But, as
Alexandra Natapoff has pointed out, the complaint is also about
under-enforcement.173 The perception in these communities is that
“whites generally benefit from more responsive law enforcement,
whether it is the speed with which the police respond to a 9-1-1 call,
or the number of officers assigned to a case, or having a police
department offer a cash reward for information.”174 All of this has the
expressive effect of “send[ing] an official message of dismissal and
devaluation.”175
Moreover, these complaints have evidentiary
168. Capers, supra note 106, at 877–78.
169. Id.
170. Id.; see also Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why
Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 231 (2008).
171. For example, according to a recent survey, 56% of all blacks believe they have
been treated unfairly by the police because of their race, and 46% believe racism
against blacks by police officers is “very common.” By contrast, only 11% of whites
share this belief. Race and Ethnicity (p. 2), POLLINGREPORT.COM,
http://www.pollingreport.com/race2.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).
172. Lautt, supra note 164, at 350–51.
173. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1716–17
(2006).
174. Capers, supra note 106, at 855.
175. Natapoff, supra note 173, at 1749.
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support. For example, a study of policing in Boston found that police
“offer less service to victims (they are less prone to offer assistance to
residents and less likely to file incident reports)” in minority
communities as compared to “higher status neighborhoods with lower
crime rates.”176 Not surprisingly, this issue has prompted Randall
Kennedy to argue that “the principle injury suffered by AfricanAmericans in relation to criminal matters is not over-enforcement but
under-enforcement of the laws.”177 Surveillance cameras, to the
extent they can play a role in solving crime and identifying
perpetrators, do some of the work of addressing this problem.178 They
certainly do the work of refuting any law enforcement claim that
crime in these communities is too difficult to solve.
I began this Article by referencing the concern, voiced by many
civil libertarians, of a world in which Big Brother watches us when we
are in public. It is a frightening scenario. But it doesn’t have to be, if
we can agree that public surveillance, to pass constitutional muster,
must be reasonable in terms of time, location, execution, and notice.
That citizens would have access to surveillance footage to challenge
police actions should also be a factor in any reasonableness
determination. But my larger point is this: the possibility that Big
Brother will watch us does not have to be frightening. The task is to
reimagine Big Brother so that he not only watches us; he also watches
over us—to reimagine Big Brother as protective, and as someone who
will be there to tell our side of the story.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing should make clear, I have been thinking about the
work camera surveillance can do to not only reduce crime, but also to
make the way we police fairer. I have been thinking about the work
camera surveillance can do to make policing—which is currently very
racialized and class-based—more egalitarian and race-neutral. I have
been thinking about the work camera surveillance can do to ensure
176. Sara E. Stoutland, The Multiple Dimensions of Trust in Resident/Police
Relations in Boston, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 226, 231 (2001).
177. KENNEDY, supra note 151, at 19.
178. It is telling that the public largely supports the use of surveillance cameras in
public spaces, with an approval rate of 71% as of 2007. See YESIL, supra note 8, at 3–
4 (reviewing polling data). It is also telling that, in New York at least, cameras
“appear least where they are desired most: in some of the city’s most crime-ridden
neighborhoods, among residents of public housing who have been experiencing
mounting violence and all of its attendant psychological disruption.” Gina Bellafante,
The Watchmen’s Misdirected Gaze, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012, at B1.
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that we are all equal citizens. In short, I have been thinking about the
work camera surveillance can do, in James Baldwin’s words, to “make
America what America must become.”179
Although cameras are not a cure-all, they can certainly make a
difference in apprehending criminals. As I have already mentioned,
we saw this possibility play out with the quick apprehension of Faisal
Shahzad in connection with his plot to detonate explosives in Times
Square.180 Now multiply that by thousands. Every day, police are
able to identify and apprehend law offenders through the use of
surveillance footage. Indeed, the day that I began writing this Article,
a seventy-three-year-old woman was raped, beaten, and robbed in
Central Park.181 Within twenty-four hours, the suspect, a drifter from
Virginia, was in custody, thanks largely to video surveillance images
of the suspect.182
But equally important, such surveillance can function to make sure
that those who police us do so in a way that is fair and egalitarian.
Just recently, a police officer in Philadelphia was captured on tape
hitting a woman in the face.183 But this is just one of many incidents
that camera surveillance has made real. In Minnesota, an officer was
filmed kicking a man in the face during an arrest.184 In Davis,
California, a police officer was captured on video pepper spraying
sitting protestors.185 In Los Angeles, two officers were caught on
surveillance camera “slamming a nurse on the ground twice—and
then fist bumping afterward—during a recent traffic stop.”186 In

179. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 24 (1963) (“[G]reat men have done
great things here, and will again, and we can make America what America must
become.”).
180. See supra Part II.B.
181. Wendy Ruderman & Andy Newman, Woman, 73, Raped in Central Park in
Broad Daylight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, at C1.
182. Wendy Ruderman & Nate Schweber, Drifter Known for Menace Is Charged
with Raping Woman, 73, in Central Park, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2012, at A1.
183. Julia Dahl, Philly Cop Caught on Video Hitting a Woman in the Face During
the Puerto Rican Day Parade, CBS NEWS (Oct. 1 2012, 11:25 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57523534-504083/philly-cop-caught-onvideo-hitting-a-woman-in-the-face-during-the-puerto-rican-day-parade/.
184. Philip Caulfield, Video: Cop Caught Kicking Suspect in Face, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Aug. 30, 2012, 10:22 AM), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-0830/news/33504744_1_police-officer-youtube-cops-paul-police.
185. Stelter, supra note 164.
186. Philip Caulfield, Brutal LAPD Arrest Caught on Video, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Aug. 29, 2012, 11:05 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/brutal-lapdarrest-caught-video-department-investigating-cops-bodyslamming-nurse-cell-phonetraffic-stop-article-1.1146962.
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Fullerton, California, video and audio captured the beating death of a
homeless man by two police officers.187 In Venice Beach, cameras
captured four officers beating a skateboarder, who later received
treatment for a concussion, a broken nose, and a fractured
cheekbone.188 In New York, Internal Affairs investigated four officers
after they were captured on video “viciously pummeling and kicking”
a suspect following a stop-and-frisk.189 Surveillance cameras also
caught two New York City police officers using their fists and a baton
to beat a young man in a Jewish Community Center,190 and caught a
police officer assaulting a cyclist.191 Of course, cameras also can
capture instances of grace and compassion, such as when a tourist
photographed a police officer in New York giving a pair of shoes to a
homeless man.192
Of all of these uses of video surveillance, it is the quick
apprehension of the drifter who raped the seventy-three-year-old
woman in Central Park that sticks with me the most. Perhaps because
in my mind, it takes me back to the case of the Central Park jogger,
the rape that shocked New York City in 1989, prompting Donald
Trump to run full page advertisements in four New York newspapers
calling for the reinstatement of the death penalty,193 and prompting a
manhunt that resulted in the arrest, interrogation, prosecution, and
conviction of five black and Hispanic teens.194 It would be thirteen
187. Kate Mather & Abby Sewell, Fullerton Police Beating of Homeless Man Is
Under Investigation, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at A1.
188. Colin Bane, Protests Over Skateboarder’s Beating, ESPN.COM (Aug. 22, 2012,
1:11 PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/print?id=8291142&type=story.
189. Kirstan Conley & Erin Calabrese, Cops Probed in Video Beating, N.Y. POST
(Feb.
1,
2012,
7:53
AM),
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/bronx/
cops_probed_in_video_beating_ql5YAP6i5LKg3FSNOAIXlO.
190. Wendy Ruderman, Charges Against Ehud Halevy Are Dropped After Video
Appears, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2012, at B1.
191. Chan, supra note 164.
192. Anthony M. DeStefano, Larry DePrimo, NYPD Cop, Buys Homeless Man
Boots, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 29, 2012, 7:44 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/11/29/larry-deprimo-nypd-cop-gives-homeless-boots_n_2209178.html.
193. Michael Wilson, Trump Draws Criticism for Ad He Ran After Jogger Attack,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at A1.
194. For a fascinating analysis of the Central Park jogger case and the role the race
of the victim played in media coverage, see JOAN DIDION, AFTER HENRY 253–319
(1992) and N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, The Scottsboro Boys, and the
Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315 (2004). Of course, the
rape prompted its own form of racial profiling. See Patricia J. Williams, In-Laws and
OutLaws, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 199, 206 (2004) (“All the young men were convicted, and
their obligingly sullen faces were melded with a notion coined on the spot, a notion of
‘wilding,’ that is, of rampaging so-called young black males. That’s really the point at
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years before the city realized that it had rushed to judgment. In 2002,
a New York court vacated their convictions after DNA evidence and
a confession linked the crime to a serial rapist, Matias Reyes, acting
alone.195 By then, the five youths had each spent between seven and
thirteen years in prison.196 Suppose we had surveillance cameras in
Central Park then, in 1989?
For too long, conventional thinking has identified the Fourth
Amendment as the problem when it comes to camera surveillance.
Maybe, just maybe, we should start thinking of the Fourth
Amendment as the solution.

which that vocabulary became part of our national discourse. And these young black
males were taking over the city. And that picture in turn justified a degree of racial
profiling on an unprecedented and now national scale.”).
195. Susan Saulny, Convictions and Charges Voided in ‘89 Central Park Jogger
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at A1. For an excellent discussion of the case, see
SARAH BURNS, THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE: A CHRONICLE OF A CITY WILDING (2011).
196. See Saulny, supra note 195.

